PART 12 - RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 12 — RECOMMENDATIONS
Recent Reforms, Their Limits, and Further Measures Needed to Address Systemic Migrant Exploitation
In its first term, the Albanese government introduced a broad array of reforms to address the proliferation of insecure work across the Australian labour market.[i] Many of these reforms were introduced at or after the time of the survey and their impact is therefore not reflected in the survey data (for example, a new "regulated worker" scheme for delivery riders and rideshare drivers and amendments to the definition of employment that address misclassification of employees as independent contractors).
These reforms are important steps in the right direction. However, they are inadequate to address of the widespread, deliberate underpayment of migrant workers revealed in this report. We recommend a number of further key measures that are critical to enable protection of migrants and enable them to report noncompliance, enable misclassified ABN-holders to more easily prove they are employees, and enable regulators to hold dishonest businesses to account.
"I felt like most of the small business owners here don't follow the Australian rules."
— Male international student from Bangladesh, in WASummary of Recommendations for the Commonwealth Government
Expand sham contracting accountability.
Reduce the burden on workers to prove misclassification, strengthen enforcement of misclassification and sham contracting laws, and consider accessorial liability for sham contracting within business operations.
Protect workers who report abuse.
Strengthen and expand access to the Workplace Justice Visa and reduce reliance on employer sponsorship for permanent residency pathways.
Expand proactive detection and support.
Invest in whole-of-government enforcement processes targeting poorly performing industries with insecure migrant workforces and establish dedicated migrant worker support services including Migrant Worker Centres in every state and territory and increased FWO support.
Link sponsorship eligibility to compliance.
Connect government agency and court data to DHA to ensure business eligibility to sponsor migrant workers takes account of prior workplace noncompliance, and industry-level risk.
Increase transparency and accountability.
Introduce a national Labour Hire Licensing Scheme and an enforceable risk-based due diligence obligation under the Modern Slavery Act, reform payslip obligations to prevent businesses from disguising noncompliance, and explore strengthened general protections preventing employer retaliation against migrant workers.
Ensure migrants recover the wages they are owed.
Establish underpayment jurisdiction in the Fair Work Commission alongside a new co-located Fair Work Court, extend the Fair Entitlements Guarantee to migrant workers, and create a government-funded wage guarantee scheme.
Increase cap on student working hours.
Explore increasing the work limitation on Student visas above 48 hours per fortnight to reduce exploitation risks and respond to increased cost of living in Australia.
Invest in compulsory worker rights education.
Ensure visa holders receive clear, accessible information about workplace rights and support services at key touchpoints, including with visa grant and multiple times post-arrival.
Expand sham contracting accountability
Recommendation 1
Consider further reducing the threshold for a claim of misclassification or sham contracting, in light of its prevalence and impact as a driver of migrant exploitation.
Recommendation 2
The Fair Work Ombudsman should prioritise detection, compliance and prevention of misclassification and sham contracting, especially where this involves visa holders.
Recommendation 3
Consider introducing accessorial liability provisions to expand accountability for sham contracting within franchises, business operations and supply chains that gain unfair financial benefits from sham contracting.
One in every five survey participants (21%) worked on an ABN in an industry in which independent contracting is not common (see Most migrant work on an ABN is likely misclassification). Among these participants, 41% were not even paid the base National Minimum Wage, let alone penalty rates or casual loading. This finding on the systemic use of ABNs to underpay migrant workers suggests that deep reforms are needed to disincentivise businesses from taking advantage of migrants’ insecurity while working on an ABN and ensure government regulators are adequately resourced to enforce existing laws and hold dishonest businesses to account.
In 2024, the government tightened the regulation of misclassification and sham contracting.[ii] These reforms were introduced at the time this survey was conducted. As claims for underpayment, misclassification and/or sham contracting work through the system, it is possible that this publicity and FWO compliance activities will raise awareness and deter the more conscientious employers who are concerned about noncompliance or penalties from engaging in these practices. However, a substantial proportion of employers of survey participants are apparently not concerned about compliance with minimum labour standards and are unlikely to be influenced by the enactment of these law reforms on their own. These employers may only be influenced by the demonstrated effect of the widespread enforcement of these laws, recognising that it remains challenging if not impossible for many migrant workers to bring an enforcement action themselves, much less prove misclassification.
There is, therefore, a critical role for the FWO in pursuing misclassification and sham contracting of migrant workers as a priority. The effectiveness of FWO compliance activities may be assisted by further reducing the evidentiary threshold for misclassification or by a reversal of the burden of proof in some cases (i.e. in situations in which misclassification is widespread, a worker on an ABN would be presumed to be an employee unless the employer can demonstrate the worker was correctly classified as an independent contractor).
The introduction of accessorial liability provisions could expand accountability for sham contracting within franchises, business operations and supply chains that obtain unfair financial gains from this practice, even if they are not directly involved in the arrangements. This would incentivise lead firms to undertake due diligence to identify use of workers on ABNs and misclassification risks.
The Commonwealth Government should provide the regulator with additional resources to conduct education campaigns for visa holders and businesses on misclassification and sham contracting in priority industries. It should also be resourced to provide direct assistance to migrant workers to demonstrate they have been misclassified. To determine whether a request for assistance by a visa holder on an ABN falls in the FWO’s jurisdiction, the FWO should be empowered to apply a presumption that a visa holder on an ABN is an employee (noting that otherwise, FWO generally does not have jurisdiction over independent contractors).
This could include a reversal of the onus of proof for the purpose of FWO Compliance Notices in some circumstances such that, where the legal status of a worker is in dispute, the party asserting that the worker is an independent contractor is required to demonstrate that the worker is not, in fact, an employee under the Fair Work Act.[iii] Visa holders on an ABN should be included where they indicate they have been paid less than they would have been entitled to as an employee under the Fair Work Act. A defence could be available to businesses that take reasonable steps to detect and address the deliberate unlawful engagement of migrants on ABNs within their franchise or business operations.
Protect workers who report abuse
Recommendation 4
Make the pilot Workplace Justice Visa and Strengthening Reporting Protections permanent and genuinely accessible nationwide, including by expanding the number and range of ATPs that can certify claims to ensure equal access across all states and territories, including for non-union members.
Recognising the need for greater accountability of employers that exploit migrant workers, in 2024 the Labor government introduced new offences criminalising an employer’s use of a migrant’s immigration status to coerce them in certain circumstances.[iv] It also introduced a prohibition declaration scheme which enables the Department of Home Affairs (‘DHA’) to ban businesses from employing migrant workers for a period if they engage in egregious exploitation.[v]
While in principle these new measures may deter some employer misconduct, they are unlikely to be effective in the absence of whistleblower protections that enable migrant workers to safely report abuse. These protections have not yet been made widely available, and, unsurprisingly, almost two years after these reforms were enacted there is only a single company listed on the Prohibited Employer Register.[vi]
If exploited migrant workers are to come forward, much more is required to reduce risks to those who report underpayment and abuse. The government already has the tools to ameliorate migrants’ fear of immigration consequences if they report abuse through the Workplace Protections Pilots which commenced in July 2024.[vii] These 2-year pilot programs introduced a new Workplace Justice visa and Strengthening Reporting Protections Pilot which could enable migrant workers to safely pursue claims against dishonest employers without risking their visa.
However, the government denied access to the protections for the vast majority of migrant workers. The protections depend on certification of workplace claims by the FWO, unions and community legal centres that are designated by the Minister for Home Affairs as Accredited Third Parties (ATPs). The FWO provides certifications when it has commenced investigation in accordance with their Compliance and Enforcement policy with a priority for vulnerable and ‘at risk’ workers. However, for workers whose claims are not subject to FWO investigations or who are reluctant to approach the regulator, there are currently only three community legal centres in NSW and Victoria that can provide the necessary certification, along with a range of unions across Australia. As the 2-year pilot approaches its conclusion, the protections remain broadly inaccessible, except to migrants who are open to joining trade unions where the union is willing to run individual claims, or who are living in Sydney or Melbourne and can access the limited assistance available through those three CLCs. Thousands of migrants who reported underpayment and other mistreatment in this survey would not have had access to the protections. The pilot should be made permanent and access to the protections should be urgently, and equitably, extended to migrant workers across Australia.
The federal government should also expand the definition of a ‘workplace exploitation matter’ to reflect the common workplace matters that affect workers approaching ATPs for certification, including General Protections matters in cases of employer retaliation. It is also critical that eligibility for the Workplace Justice visa be extended beyond 28 days before or after visa expiry, and that the visa be available to Bridging visa holders and undocumented workers.[viii]
Expand proactive detection and support
Recommendation 5
Resource whole-of-government approaches to address systemic noncompliance in industries with highly insecure migrant workforces, in coordination with state and territory regulators.
Recommendation 6
Expand dedicated support services for migrant workers to identify underpayment and take action. This includes establishing dedicated migrant worker support within the Fair Work Ombudsman; establishing Migrant Worker Centres in every state and territory; and resourcing Community Legal Centres and Legal Aid to provide advice and representation to more migrant workers in workplace matters.
The Commonwealth Government introduced significant legislative reforms in its first term of government to increase the likelihood of detection, as well as the likelihood of penalty and severity of penalties, for businesses that do not comply with the Fair Work Act. These include a new criminal offence of wage theft.[ix] The government strengthened union right of entry powers to investigate suspected underpayment.[x] and the FWO has increasingly adopted a tripartite enforcement model in collaboration with worker representatives and industry.[xi] These reforms were all introduced around or after the time of the survey, and their impact is not reflected in the survey data. Indeed, it may take several years before the effect of the new civil remedy provision reforms and the new FWO criminal jurisdiction can be evaluated.
Nevertheless, the extent of systemic noncompliance revealed in this survey suggests that the FWO cannot fix this alone, even with the new powers and tools that have been introduced. There remain critical gaps in industry-specific government enforcement that require multi-agency collaboration (as the FWO has recently undertaken with the ATO to address sham contracting).[xii]
Greater coordination is therefore required between agencies such as the FWO, ATO, ASIC, DHA, ABF and AFP, as well as coordination with state regulators in relation to labour hire and workplace health and safety contraventions, to address migrant exploitation in industries such as hospitality, retail, commercial cleaning, nail salons, car washes and massage shops. The extent of underpayment and noncompliance in these industries should ‘provide to regulators a mandate to direct time, attention and resources’ to the situation of workers in these industries, and to develop and implement processes for effective coordination.[xiii]
It also critical that migrant workers can access support services through multiple touchpoints to assist with understanding and assertion of their rights, including underpayment calculations, advice on misclassification, and advice on employer retaliation and other workplace claims.[xiv] Services must be adequately resourced to ensure accessibility in regional locations where exploitation risks are especially high for workers who are especially isolated and alone.
"It's very exhausting. It's very disheartening. We feel alone, especially as students. Constantly feeling the threat of being harmed or affecting our visa because many of us are literally not even 20 and in our late teens. Away from family and not aware of our rights."
— Female international student from India, 22, in NSWLink sponsorship eligibility to compliance
Recommendation 7
Create a structured mechanism that brings information about previous workplace noncompliance to DHA’s attention as part of the ‘adverse information’ DHA considers when determining a business’ migrant sponsorship application.
Mechanisms should be developed to systematically marshal existing information on workplace noncompliance for DHA, to ensure that employers who breach workplace responsibilities are not approved to sponsor new migrant workers. Improved intelligence gathering by DHA, and structured information-sharing with the FWO and other agencies, courts and commissions, could better ensure that ‘adverse information’ as to a person's prior workplace noncompliance is brought to DHA’s attention when determining a new visa sponsorship application or nomination.
Under reg 1.13A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), ‘adverse information’ could include FWO investigations and compliance activities, court judgments including wage cases in the Small Claims jurisdiction and state industrial relations tribunals, and Fair Work Commission orders. Given the practice of corporate phoenixing by problematic employers of migrant workers, this information should extend to prior workplace noncompliance by a company’s officers and directors. Adverse information could also relate to prevalence of migrant exploitation at an industry level, with a higher level of scrutiny applied to sponsorship or nomination applications for industries with known systemic workplace noncompliance in relation to visa holders, such as hospitality. Measures should be adopted to protect existing sponsored workers and other visa holder employees when an employer sponsor is barred from sponsorship.
Increase transparency and accountability
Recommendation 8
Introduce a national Labour Hire Licensing Scheme.
Recommendation 9
Introduce an enforceable, risk-based due diligence obligation on business to detect and address forced labour, through an amendment to the Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth).
Recommendation 10
Industry should voluntarily play a greater role in detecting underpayment and other noncompliance in their Australian operations and supply chains, starting with routine auditing of payslips and scrutiny of visa holders engaged on ABNs and as casuals.
Recommendation 11
Explore measures to strengthen general protections against common forms of employer retaliation against migrant workers that prevent migrants from asserting workplace rights.
There is a pressing need for government to address the well-documented exploitation of migrant workers engaged through unscrupulous labour hire providers (rather than direct employment), particularly in horticulture where small operators disappear overnight and cannot be held to account. We did not ask survey participants whether they were employed directly or via labour hire because we believed this question would be difficult for some participants to understand and as a result the data would be unreliable.[xv] However, existing research indicates this is a clear enforcement gap that must be urgently filled in order to systemically address underpayment and exploitation of migrant workers.[xvi]
This is best addressed through a licensing regime to hold these providers to account for Fair Work Act noncompliance, enable businesses to reliably source workers from reputable compliant labour hire providers, and remove fly-by-night operators.[xvii] Failing this, every state and territory should establish a scheme at the state level, with harmonisation across jurisdictions wherever possible.
More effective business responses are also needed to proactively detect underpayment and other noncompliance, as well as modern slavery indicators, in their operations and supply chains. These are critical to level the playing field for honest businesses trying to compete in industries riven with migrant exploitation, and to meet their responsibilities with respect to modern slavery.
Large businesses should not only be required to report annually on their efforts to address modern slavery, but to take reasonable actions to address the most severe risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. Responsibilities should be heightened for their operations within Australia. Our research can also be used to guide businesses seeking to identify systemic noncompliance and forced labour indicators in their operations and supply chains.
Following the release of this report we will publish a separate Practical Guidance setting out specific insights and recommendations for industry.
Our findings show that migrant workers who are casual employees are at far greater risk of underpayment and other noncompliance than permanent employees. Many do not try to assert their rights for fear their employer will retaliate by cutting their shifts, giving them worse work, or terminating their employment. These forms of retaliation are recognised as a form of prohibited adverse action under the Fair Work Act’s general protections. However, because of the irregular nature of casual work and lack of guaranteed future work, retaliation is very difficult to prove in this context. This is especially the case when retaliation involves a gradual reduction of shifts or subtle changes to fewer hours or worse shifts.
Within the 2024 Fair Work Act reforms, the federal government recognised the insecurity of casual work and introduced a new ‘casual conversion’ law.[xviii] Unfortunately, this does not address the key threat of employer retaliation against underpaid migrant casual employees because most would be ineligible for conversion because they remain genuinely casual and work in small businesses for less than 12 months.
In addition, and beyond the casual employment context, numerous survey participants described threats of employer retaliation in the form of withdrawing current sponsorship of migrant workers on employer-sponsored visas, withdrawing a promise of future sponsorship for residence or rescinding an offer of future sponsorship for other temporary visa holders such as Temporary Graduates or students. Stronger measures are required to strengthen general protections around employer retaliation against migrant workers, in particular targeting an employer’s rostering of fewer or worse shifts for casual employees who assert their workplace rights (including misclassified workers on ABNs) and retaliation in the form of an employer’s withdrawal of visa sponsorship or rescinding a promise of future sponsorship.
Ensure migrants recover the wages they are shortchanged
Recommendation 12
Establish jurisdiction for underpayment in the Fair Work Commission, alongside a new co-located Fair Work Court.
Recommendation 13
Establish a government-funded wage guarantee scheme to ensure that any worker with a wage judgment in their favour receives their lawful entitlements if their employer does not pay.
Recommendation 14
Extend the Fair Entitlements Guarantee scheme to migrant workers to provide redress for unpaid wages when their employer liquidates, as is provided to non-migrant workers.
Our research has found that the current small claims process in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia is too complex, technical and formal for most migrant workers to navigate without assistance.[xix] We therefore recommend amendments to the Fair Work Act to enable the Fair Work Commission to conduct compulsory conciliation to resolve wage and/or entitlement claims, modelled on the FWC's existing general protections (involving dismissal) jurisdiction.
We also recommend the establishment of a new Fair Work Court to sit alongside the FWC, with Commissioners and Judges jointly appointed to both institutions. This would create a simple, affordable, accessible, and efficient process for employees to pursue underpayment claims.
In addition, to ensure no worker who obtains a court-ordered wage payment in the small claims jurisdiction remains unpaid, the Government should establish a guarantee scheme administered by DEWR that pays unpaid debts to affected workers. DEWR could then decide whether to deploy resources to take enforcement action against the employer and recover the debt. To minimise the number of matters to be paid under this scheme, DEWR could also notify the employer that, if the debt remains unpaid, the matter will be referred to the Department of Home Affairs resulting in a possible ban on the employer hiring temporary visa holders under the Prohibited Employer List, or unfavourable outcomes on migrant sponsorship applications.
Increase cap on student working hours
Recommendation 15
Explore increasing the work limitation on the student visa above 48 hours per fortnight to reduce exploitation risks and respond to increased cost of living in Australia.
This survey has revealed widespread sentiment among international students that this restriction critically limits their access to lawfully paid jobs, pushes them into “cash jobs” and then, in a vicious cycle, causes them to work more hours than permitted to make ends meet on these unlawfully low wages. Many international students also noted the substantially increased cost of living (in particular rent and food) that they struggle to meet with only 48 hours per fortnight of (generally underpaid) work. This is associated with high levels of stress and distress, with substantial mental health impact. Numerous open responses suggested 30 hours per week as the appropriate limit to enable them to access lawful work (and productively utilise their existing qualifications and skills) while they study and enable them to meet the increased cost of living in Australia.
The government should evaluate the impact of increased cost of living on international students, the impact of the work restriction on employer willingness to hire international students in lawfully paid jobs, and the impact of widespread underpayment and mistreatment in the jobs in which most international students work, including the consequences of poor working conditions and financial distress on international students’ studies, experience in Australia, and mental health.
Invest in compulsory worker rights education
Recommendation 16
Invest in compulsory worker rights education and awareness as a prevention measure.
There remain significant gaps in migrant workers’ knowledge of their workplace rights. Comparing our survey data over time, knowledge of the minimum wage for a casual employee has remained consistently low, with only a small increase from 25% who knew the casual minimum in 2019 to 34% in 2024. Additionally, over a quarter of participants still do not know the National Minimum Wage.
Resourcing is required to expand dedicated support services for migrant workers to identify and address underpayment and assert other workplace rights. The government and unions should also invest further resources in compulsory worker rights education and awareness-raising at key touchpoints. Visa holders should receive clear, accessible information about workplace rights and where to get help at multiple key touchpoints throughout their migration journey. This includes embedding this information in the visa grant communication process predeparture, as well as in post-arrival processes, and on a regular basis through universities and other institutions engaging large numbers of visa holders. Information should include referrals to the relevant union in key industries with greater concentrations of migrant workers, as well as to local CLCs, student legal services, Legal Aid and the Fair Work Ombudsman.
"I feel there are some employers out there who take advantage of internationals lack of knowledge about the wage system in Australia. With minimum wage and award wages, casual work and part/full-time work being different. I think when coming to Australia on a visa that allows internationals to work, providing them with proper resources to educate themselves would be beneficial. For example, upon entry or granting of your visa, received an email with the basics explained and links to additional resources."
Female international student from the Netherlands, in QueenslandTaken together, these sixteen recommendations address an exploitation system that is newly visible. We now know how Australian businesses structure work to evade the Fair Work Act, which violations cluster, and what regulators and businesses can look for to detect underpayment and deeper exploitation of migrants. Each of these recommended reforms closes a gap migrants have named in their own words across this report. Implemented together, they would let workers come forward without losing their visa, their shifts, or their savings and would enable honest businesses to compete on a level playing field.
References
[i] These include extensive amendments to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) through the Closing the Loopholes, Protecting Worker Entitlements, and Secure Jobs, Better Pay reforms, as well as the Strengthening Employer Compliance amendments to the Migration Act: Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes) Act 2023 (Cth); Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes No 2) Act 2024 (Cth); Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Protecting Worker Entitlements) Act 2023 (Cth); Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Secure Jobs, Better Pay) Act 2022 (Cth); Migration Amendment (Strengthening Employer Compliance) Act 2024 (Cth).
[ii] The reforms include a new broader definition of 'employment' which engages protections under the FW Act. An employee is now distinguished from an Independent Contractor by reference to the true nature of the relationship, rather than, as was previously the case, by reference to the terms of the contract. For the purpose of the FW Act, the terms 'employee' and 'employer' would be determined by assessing the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the working relationship, by considering the 'totality' of the relationship. This returns to the multi-factorial assessment to determine whether a relationship is one of employment for national system employees prior to High Court decisions in 2022. These decisions held that the nature of the relationship was to be determined primarily by reference to the terms of the contract. See CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2. In addition, the defence to sham contracting is now narrower: to avoid offending, a business must now show that it 'reasonably believed' the contract was a contract for services (previously, a business could mount a defence against sham contracting simply by showing it was not reckless as to the misclassification): Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 357(2). Greater penalties have also been introduced for certain businesses which have engaged in sham contracting.
[iii] The Senate Education and Employment References Committee, Corporate Avoidance of the Fair Work Act (Report, September 2017) Recommendation 24.
[iv] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 245AAA, 245AAB and 245AAC.
[v] Ibid Division 12 Subdivision E.
[vi] Australian Border Force, 'Prohibited Employer Register' Australian Border Force (Webpage) https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/prohibited/prohibited-employer-register.
[vii] Migration Amendment (Workplace Justice Visa) Regulations 2024 (Cth); Department of Home Affairs, 'Strengthening Reporting Protections Pilot' Department of Home Affairs (Webpage) https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/working-in-australia/work-rights-and-exploitation/strengthening-reporting-protections-pilot; Department of Home Affairs, 'Australian Government Endorsed Events (Workplace Justice Pilot)' Department of Home Affairs (Webpage) https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/temporary-activity-408/australian-government-endorsed-events-workplace-justice-pilot.
[viii] Department of Home Affairs, 'Australian Government Endorsed Events (Workplace Justice Pilot)' Department of Home Affairs (Webpage) https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/temporary-activity-408/australian-government-endorsed-events-workplace-justice-pilot; For further information on measures required to strengthen the protections and make them accessible to migrants for whom they are needed, see Migrant Workers Centre, In review: Australia's visa protection pilots (Policy brief, 20 June 2025) https://www.migrantworkers.org.au/visa_protection_pilots.
[ix] The reforms introduced higher maximum civil penalties for standard civil breaches and serious contraventions of certain civil remedy provisions of the Fair Work Act, and a lower threshold for a serious contravention (reduced from conduct done knowingly and systematically, to conduct done either knowingly or recklessly): Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 12, 357(2), 539, 546, 557A. This applies to bodies corporate that are not small business employers, in line with the Australian Government's election commitment to implement the recommendations of the Australian Government, Report of the Migrant Workers' Taskforce (Report, March 2019) and ensures serious civil contraventions operate sensibly alongside the wage theft criminal offence introduced by the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes) Act 2024 (Cth). It also introduced a new criminal offence of wage theft for intentional employer conduct that results in underpayment of its employees (effective from 1 January 2025): Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 327A.
[x] This includes a new option of surprise inspections of the employer's records without the usual 24-hour notice: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 483A. The amendments provide that an entry permit holder can apply to the Commission for an exemption certificate, waiving the usual 24-hour notice period for entry to workplaces, but only where the Commission is satisfied there is a suspected underpayment of wages affecting a member of the registered organisation, and reasonably believes that advance notice of entry would hinder an effective investigation into the suspected contravention.
[xi] Fair Work Ombudsman, Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman Annual Report 2024–25 (Report, 30 September 2025) 39; Tess Hardy, Stephen Clibborn and Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 'A Tripartite Experiment In Australia: Seeking To Improve Compliance Through Collaboration' (2026) Dispatches 5.
[xii] Fair Work Ombudsman, 'Sham contracting in the spotlight' Fair Work Ombudsman (Media release, 13 March 2026) https://www.fairwork.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/2026-media-releases/march-2026/20260313-sham-contracting-media-release.
[xiii] John Howe and Tom Dillon, Underpaid and Overlooked: The Wage Crisis Facing Young Workers in Australia — Final Report of the Fair Day's Work Project (Report, July 2025) Recommendation 1.
[xiv] Brendan Coates, Trent Wiltshire and Tyler Reysenbach, Short-changed: How to stop the exploitation of migrant workers in Australia (Report, 23 May 2023) Rec 24.
[xv] Office of the NSW Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Be Our Guests: Addressing Urgent Modern Slavery Risks for Temporary Migrant Workers in Rural and Regional New South Wales (Report, 2024); Evidence to Modern Slavery Committee Inquiry into Modern Slavery Risks Faced by Temporary Migrant Workers in Rural and Regional New South Wales, New South Wales Legislative Council, Blue Room, C.ex Coffs, Coffs Harbour, 11 December 2025, 4-5 (Giles Fryer).
[xvi] In 2024, the government introduced reforms to remove incentives for businesses to engage workers through labour hire agencies by empowering the Fair Work Commission to order that labour hire employees be paid what they would have received as a direct employee: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 306E. This is important, but does not address the critical lack of oversight and accountability of labour hire providers.
[xvii] Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have established licensing and enforcement regimes for these providers, however there is currently no licensing system for providers operating in other states and territories. See: https://www.fairwork.gov.au/find-help-for/labour-hire-and-supply-chains/managing-your-labour-contracting; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Part 2-2 Division 4A.
[xviii] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Part 2-2 Division 4A.
[xix] Catherine Hemingway, Fiona Yeh, Laurie Berg and Bassina Farbenblum, All Work, No Pay: Improving the Legal System so Migrants can get the Wages They are Owed (Report, 2024) 8.